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Abstract
Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an
endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few ﬁrms? Although this
question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has
yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether ﬁrms with an
initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in cost reductions than ﬁrms
with higher initial costs. We ﬁnd that the initial competitive advantages are in-
deed self-reinforcing, but subjects in the role of ﬁrms overinvest relative to the
Nash equilibrium. However, the pattern of overinvestment even strengthens
the tendency towards self-reinforcing cost advantages relative to the theoretical
prediction. Further, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium, aggregate invest-
ment is not aﬀected by the initial eﬃciency distribution. Finally, investment
spillovers reduce investment, and investment is higher than the joint-proﬁt
maximizing benchmark for the case without spillovers and lower for the case
with spillovers.
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1 Introduction
Market dominance has many conceivable sources. In some cases, it results from
exogenous sources such as state intervention, technology or demand shocks. Quite
often, however, the dominance of a small number of ﬁrms or even a single market
leader appears to be the endogenous outcome of market interaction. For instance,
in food retailing, a small number of ﬁrms have established themselves as leaders,
with Wal-Mart playing the most important role, not only in the U.S., but also in
other countries such as Britain. Academic publishing has seen increasing concentra-
tion worldwide, with Elsevier leading the pack (Edlin and Rubinfeld, 2005). The
‘new economy’ also provides well-known examples of endogenous market dominance.
For instance, Microsoft has acquired the lead in the markets for operating systems
and oﬃce software, whereas Google dominates the market for search engines (Fergu-
son, 2005).
Obviously, an explanation of why market dominance came about in each of these
examples requires detailed consideration of the particular case, each of which is char-
acterized by idiosyncratic elements.1 Nevertheless, the examples lead to a common
question: Are there any “natural” forces that explain why ﬁrms can so often main-
tain or even expand an initial lead, that is, why initial advantages of ﬁrms might be
self-reinforcing, thereby leading to an extension of the initial lead? To identify such
a force in the simplest possible way, it is useful to consider a setting with a ﬁxed
number of ﬁrms.2 Suppose further that ﬁrms can invest into cost reductions which
increase both the output and the mark-up that they can command in product-market
equilibrium.3 These two beneﬁcial eﬀects of lower costs are mutually reinforcing: The
higher mark-up is worth more when output is high, and conversely, the higher output
is worth more when the mark-up is high. As a result of these demand-markup com-
plementarities, ﬁrms that already have a high market share typically beneﬁt more
from an increase in eﬃciency than ﬁrms with relatively low share, thus giving them
a greater incentive to invest than their lagging competitors.
This kind of mechanism lies at the heart of most explanations of self-reinforcing
dominance.4 In spite of the fact that convincing explanations for self-reinforcing dom-
inance can be given, it is by no means true that there is a universal tendency for mar-
kets to move in this direction. Commercial jet aircraft production, for instance, has
seen several changes in market leadership since World War II (Sutton, 1998). In the
PC market, IBM lost its initial dominance in the nineteen eighties (Stavins, 1995).
1For instance, in the Wal-Mart case, incremental investments and acquisitions of smaller ﬁrms
played and important role. In academic publishing, there are mergers between big players. Microsoft
beneﬁted from network externalities, and Google introduced several successful product innovations.
2Aydemir and Schmutzler (in press) identify similar forces in a setting where acquisitions and
entry are allowed.
3Similar arguments can be made for product quality improvements.
4Athey and Schmutzler (2001) make the point most explicitly, but the models of Flaherty (1980)
and Budd et al. (1993) rely on similar forces. Similar eﬀects are also present when a higher output
involves lower costs because of learning-by doing (Cabral and Riordan, 1994) or when it enhances
demand because of network eﬀects.
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These counterexamples are not necessarily evidence for a contradiction of theories
of self-reinforcing dominance. Indeed, authors such as Athey and Schmutzler (2001)
have pointed out that countervailing forces may well limit the power of increasing
dominance. For instance, when imitation is cheap, catching up with a leader may
be much less costly than expanding a lead. Then, even when demand-markup com-
plementarities make cost reductions more attractive for leaders, the fact that any
given cost reduction is easier to achieve for laggards may well mean that increasing
dominance does not arise.
However, without further evidence, it is hard to substantiate the claim that coun-
terexamples to increasing dominance are not a challenge to the basic economic ideas
outlined above. In principle, for instance, there might be behavioral forces inducing a
tendency for laggards to invest excessively relative to theoretical predictions.5 Unfor-
tunately, in a given market environment, it is hard to be sure about whether economic
fundamentals are indeed such that self-reinforcing dominance should emerge. More-
over, markets are typically subject to many exogenous inﬂuences (that may favor or
hinder increasing dominance), which makes it diﬃcult to attribute the development
of dominance to an endogenous self-reinforcing process.
To see whether economic agents respond to the incentives leading to self-rein-
forcing dominance, it is therefore important to control for potential exogenous shocks
and, at the same time, to guarantee that the setting is such that the forces in fa-
vor of increasing dominance dominate over potential countervailing forces. Finding
such a clean setting in real-world markets is diﬃcult. Therefore, it is unsurpris-
ing that the empirical analysis of self-reinforcing dominance essentially reduces to
anecdotal evidence. In laboratory experiments, however, it is possible to control
for the above-mentioned confounding factors. In the following, we therefore present
an experiment that tests whether demand-markup complementarities indeed lead to
increasing dominance. In doing so, we provide, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst empirical
analysis of increasing dominance.6
We study a simple version of a two-stage model of R&D competition that has
received considerable attention in the literature. In this model, oligopolistic ﬁrms
that potentially diﬀer in their initial marginal costs ﬁrst carry out cost-reducing
investments which may or may not have positive spillover eﬀects for the competitors.
Then they engage in Cournot competition.7
To address the issue of self-reinforcing dominance, we clearly require asymmetric
treatments where subjects have diﬀerent initial eﬃciency levels. In these asymmetric
treatments, we assume that there are three types of ﬁrms, namely leaders, followers
and laggards (in decreasing order of marginal costs). We compare the investment
5For instance, it is possible to construct a model where laggards invest more than leaders if,
compared to a symmetric situation, decision makers in ﬁrms experience stronger losses from falling
behind than they beneﬁt from getting ahead.
6Even beyond the issue of increasing dominance, the experimental analysis of R&D investment
games is rare. Isaac and Reynolds (1998) and Suetens (2005) deal with issues of appropriability,
Silipo (2005) and Zizzo (2002) investigate patent races.
7Similar two-stage Cournot models have, for instance, been used by Brander and Spencer (1983),
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Suzumura (1992), and Leahy and Neary (1997).
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levels of the three types of players in the asymmetric treatments. As the theoreti-
cal model underlying our experiment displays demand-markup complementarities, it
predicts increasing dominance, the property whereby the more eﬃcient ﬁrm tends to
increase its lead by investing more into cost-reduction than the competitors.8 The
evidence provides overwhelming support for this conclusion. Both in the spillover
and in the no-spillover treatments, leaders invest more than followers and followers
invest more than laggards. This result suggests that, in a dynamic context, mar-
ket dominance would emerge endogenously, as small initial asymmetries would tend
to reinforce each other. Importantly, increasing dominance comes out even more
strongly in the lab than theory would suggest. Subjects have a tendency to over-
invest relative to the Nash equilibrium, and this tendency is more pronounced the
more eﬃcient subjects initially are, that is, the lower their marginal costs. Thus the
diﬀerence between the investments of more eﬃcient and less eﬃcient ﬁrms in the
laboratory is greater than in the Nash equilibrium.
In principle, it would be possible to analyze increasing dominance in a single
asymmetric treatment, by comparing the investments of leaders, followers and lag-
gards as described. Instead, we vary treatments in three dimensions, thereby allowing
us to test the robustness of the predictions, and, more importantly, to deal with issues
of independent interest.
In a ﬁrst variation, we compare our asymmetric treatments with symmetric treat-
ments where ﬁrms are initially identical. This allows us to address a fundamental
issue in the analysis of R&D decisions, namely the relation between the “techno-
logical gap” (Aghion et al., 2001) and aggregate investment activity. Starting from
a situation with symmetric ﬁrms, suppose one group of ﬁrms has lower marginal
costs whereas another group has higher marginal costs, but the average eﬃciency
is unaﬀected. Should aggregate investment in the former, “neck-to-neck” case, be
higher than in the latter, leader-laggard case?9 Theoretically, this is not obvious.
On the one hand, with demand-markup complementarities, the leaders have higher
investment incentives; on the other hand, the laggards have lower incentives, so that
the aggregate eﬀect is unclear. In the Cournot model underlying our analysis, the
two eﬀects exactly cancel out, so that investments are independent of the technolog-
ical gap. Our experiments conﬁrm the prediction, no matter whether we allow for
spillovers or not.
A second variation concerns the appropriability of investments. We compare
treatments where cost reductions have no spillovers on competitors with those where
they do. This allows us to ask whether imperfect appropriability of investments
indeed reduces subjects’ inclination to invest, as standard theory would predict
(Spence, 1984). This is another theoretical result which has proved hard to conﬁrm
8In the terminology of Athey and Schmutzler (2001), this would be weak increasing dominance.
Note that we assume away potential countervailing forces by making the marginal costs of invest-
ment independent of previous investments.
9The inﬂuence of the technological gap on investment incentives plays a central role in Aghion
et al.’s (2001) analysis of the relation between competition and innovation. However, they consider
a setting with diﬀerentiated price competition.
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with ﬁeld data: For instance, the disincentive eﬀect of spillovers is not discernible in
the data set employed by Levin (1988). He provides possible explanations why, con-
trary to the prediction of Spence’s model, investment is not discouraged by the high
levels of spillover in electronics-based industries. Our experiments clearly show that
lower appropriability reduces investments, which supports theory.10 The comparison
of the spillover and the no-spillover treatment leads to another interesting obser-
vation. In both treatments, subjects overinvest relative to the Nash prediction. As
investments have negative externalities in the no-spillover case and positive external-
ities in the spillover case, behavior is thus more cooperative than the Nash prediction
suggests in the no-spillover case and less cooperative in the spillover case.11 In the
paper, we suggest an explanation of this phenomenon that relies on social preferences.
Our third and ﬁnal treatment variation is exclusively motivated by robustness
considerations. We consider both low-eﬃciency and high-eﬃciency treatments, which
diﬀer in the initial average level of marginal cost. Our results are robust with respect
to this treatment variation.
A striking feature of our analysis is that the deviations from the Nash equilibrium are,
albeit signiﬁcant, fairly small. In fact, given the complex nature of the experiment, it
is amazing how close the outcome is to the Nash equilibrium, no matter whether we
are considering treatments with or without spillovers, and symmetric or asymmetric
cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the ana-
lytical framework. Section 3 formulates the testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes
the experimental design. Section 5 contains the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
The analytical framework combines features of the two-stage model of d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988) with the dynamic analysis of Athey and Schmutzler (2001):
The ex-ante heterogeneity between ﬁrms that is central to the latter paper is intro-
duced into the static framework of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin.
Our model is deliberately designed to capture the essence of the strategic interac-
tion in investment models. Like d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, we therefore consider
only one period of investment. Even though this might seem to be at odds with
our objective of understanding important aspects of dynamic investment behavior,
there are several reasons why we proceeded in this fashion. First, most importantly,
the basic forces towards high investments of relatively eﬃcient ﬁrms that show up in
a fully dynamic model are already present in a one-period version of the model, so
that the subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game also satisﬁes increasing
dominance with respect to initial eﬃciency levels. Intuitively, in the static version
10Suetens (2005) also shows that lack of appropriability has negative eﬀects on investment, but
she only considers a symmetric Cournot duopoly setting. Isaac and Reynolds (1988) have a similar
result in a stochastic invention model.
11Andreoni (1995) comes to similar conclusions for privately provided public goods.
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leaders invest more because they beneﬁt more from demand/markup-increases; in the
dynamic version they also take the eﬀects of their investments in future rounds of
the investment game into account. However, these long-term considerations reinforce
the short-term considerations, because any given improvement of the initial position
in a future investment game is more valuable for a ﬁrm that starts out ahead of the
others. Second, while a dynamic version of the game is implementable in principle,
the strategic complexity of the situation is likely to lead to informational overload
in an experimental context. Third, our approach of considering only one period per
game allows us to put subjects into diﬀerent roles in diﬀerent periods, which helps
us to provide treatment variation.
2.1 Setup
We consider an oligopolistic industry with a ﬁnite number of I ≥ 2 ﬁrms producing
a homogeneous product. Let p = a−Q be the inverse demand function, where p and
Q denote, respectively, the price and the aggregate output of this product. Firms
engage in two-stage competition. In the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm i chooses an investment
in marginal cost reduction. In the second stage, ﬁrms compete a` la Cournot in the
product market.
We assume that ﬁrm i initially has marginal cost c − Y i0 for some exogenous
reference level c of marginal costs in the industry, so that Y i0 is interpreted as the
initial (exogenous) eﬃciency level of ﬁrm i. In the ﬁrst stage, givenY0 ≡ (Y 10 , ..., Y I0 ),
each ﬁrm i takes an investment decision, yi, and we let y ≡ (y1, ..., yI). In the second
stage, ﬁrm i has marginal costs
ci = c− Y i1 , (1)
where Y i1 is the eﬃciency level at the beginning of this stage.
Firm i’s eﬃciency level depends on its initial eﬃciency level, on own investment,
and possibly also on each competitor’s investment in marginal cost reduction. More
speciﬁcally, ﬁrm i’s eﬃciency level is
Y i1 = Y
i
0 + y
i + λ
∑
j =i
yj, with λ ∈ [0, 1]. (2)
Here, the parameter λ captures spillovers: If λ = 0, there are no spillovers; if λ =
1, each ﬁrm’s investments are shared completely. Obviously, for 0 < λ < 1, the
spillovers are imperfect.12
The investment cost function for a direct reduction in marginal costs is given by
k(yi) = κ
(
yi
)2
, with κ > 0.
Thus, the function displays increasing marginal costs.13
12Letting I = 2, Eq. (2) includes the model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) if the ﬁrms’
initial eﬃciency levels are zero. In the more general framework of Athey and Schmutzler (2001),
Eq. (2) provides a simple explicit speciﬁcation of ﬁrm i’s state dynamics.
13Note that this cost function depends only on investments and not on initial eﬃciency levels.
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When ﬁrms choose their investments y in the ﬁrst stage, they can either do so
non-cooperatively or cooperatively. In both cases, we solve the game using backward
induction.
2.2 The Second Stage
At the beginning of the second-stage game, Y1 ≡ (Y 11 , ..., Y I1 ) summarizes the ﬁrms’
eﬃciency levels, which correspond to marginal costs c ≡ (c1, ..., cI). It is well known
that equilibrium outputs in the linear Cournot model with heterogenous ﬁrms are
given by
qi(c) =
a− Ici +∑j =i cj
I + 1
.
Substituting ci = c− Y i1 from (1) and letting α ≡ a− c, equilibrium output levels as
a function of eﬃciency levels can be expressed as
qi(Y1) =
α + IY i1 −
∑
j =i Y
j
1
I + 1
.
An immediate implication is that equilibrium product market proﬁts are given by
πi(Y1) =
(
α + IY i1 −
∑
j =i Y
j
1
I + 1
)2
. (3)
2.3 The First Stage
Equation (3) gives the equilibrium product market proﬁts in the second-stage game
as a function of the ﬁrst-stage outcome, summarized by Y1. To obtain an expression
for ﬁrm i’s net proﬁt in terms of cost reductions and the parameters, we substitute
the eﬃciency levels by the corresponding expression given in (2) and subtract the
costs of investing. After rearranging, ﬁrm i’s net proﬁt reads
Πi(y;Y0, α, λ, κ)
=
(
α + IY i0 −
∑
j =i Y
j
0 + (I + λ(1− I)) yi + (2λ− 1)
∑
j =i y
j
I + 1
)2
− κ (yi)2 . (4)
Assuming positive outputs, diﬀerentiating ﬁrm i’s net proﬁt with respect to yj implies
sign
(
∂Πi
∂yj
)
= sign (2λ− 1) ,
which gives rise to the following observation:
Observation 1. The game is characterized by negative (positive) externalities if the
spillover parameter λ is smaller (larger) than 0.5, as a marginal increase of a rival’s
investment reduces (increases) ﬁrm i’s net proﬁt.
7
To understand this observation, note that an increase in the investment of a
competitor aﬀects a ﬁrm through two channels. First, there is a negative eﬀect of
facing a more eﬃcient competitor. Second, there is a positive eﬀect of becoming
more eﬃcient by obtaining spillovers. For λ < 0.5, the negative eﬀect dominates; for
values of λ > 0.5, the positive eﬀect does.
We now proceed to determine the subgame-perfect equilibrium investments.
2.4 The Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
Assuming that the ﬁrms choose their investments non-cooperatively, ﬁrm i’s optimal
investment decision, taking the decisions of the other ﬁrms y−i as given, solves
max
yi≥0
Πi(yi,y−i;Y0, α, λ, κ).
In the subsequent analysis, we proceed under the assumption that second-order and
stability conditions hold.14 Reﬂecting the quadratic objective function, ﬁrm i’s best-
response function is linear and shown in the Appendix to be of the form
Ri(y−i) = φi − Π
i
ij
Πiii
∑
j =i
yj, with φi > 0,
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Note that ﬁrm i’s output depends only
on the sum of the opponents’ outputs.15 This property of the Cournot game allows
us to present the game to the subjects in matrix form.
In the Appendix, we provide a closed-form solution for the equilibrium invest-
ment levels. Substituting these quantities in the corresponding expression above
produces ﬁrm i’s equilibrium output level, the product market proﬁt, and the net
proﬁt attained in equilibrium.
2.5 Implications
In this section, we shall derive three testable implications of the theory. The ﬁrst
result addresses increasing dominance and shows that more eﬃcient ﬁrms invest more
in equilibrium that their competitors. The proposition thus provides the core of an
argument for self-reinforcing concentration.16
14A formal statement of these conditions is provided in the Appendix.
15Moreover, using the second order condition,
sign
(
∂Ri(y−i)
∂yj
)
= sign
(
Πiij
)
= sign (2λ− 1) ,
so that reaction curves are downward sloping if λ < 0.5 (i.e., investments are strategic substitutes)
and upward sloping if λ > 0.5 (i.e., investments are strategic complements). If λ = 0.5, the ﬁrms’
investment choices are independent of rivals’ actions. The proof of the last equality is provided in
the Appendix.
16Increasing dominance can also be derived from more general results in Athey and Schmut-
zler (2001); the remaining results we provide are novel for the asymmetric case.
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Proposition 1 (Dominance). For all i = j, Y i0 > Y j0 implies yi∗ > yj∗.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand the intuition, it is important to note two key properties of ﬁrm i’s
net proﬁt function given in (4), namely
∂2Πi(·)
∂Y i0∂y
i
> 0 and
∂2Πi(·)
∂Y j0 ∂y
i
< 0. (5)
The ﬁrst property is very intuitive once one takes the underlying oligopoly model
into account: Other things equal, ﬁrms with high initial eﬃciency level Y i0 have high
demand (mark-up). The proﬁt gain from increasing mark-up (demand) by investing
into marginal cost reduction is therefore higher. This property suggests that, leaving
strategic eﬀects aside, ﬁrms with high initial eﬃciency levels should invest more than
ﬁrms with low initial eﬃciency levels. Similar reasoning can be used to explain
the second property intuitively: This property implies that ﬁrms invest more when
competitors have low initial eﬃciency levels. Together, both properties identify the
source of increasing dominance: The high demand of a leader coming from its high
initial eﬃciency level and the competitor’s low initial eﬃciency level both increase
the marginal incentive to invest.17
The next result is an immediate consequence of the quadratic net proﬁt function.
Proposition 2 (Technological Gap). (i) Given Y0, aggregate investment y
∗ ≡∑
i y
i∗ is determined by the sum of the initial eﬃciency levels,
∑
i Y
i
0 , independently
of their distribution. (ii) For an asymmetric initial eﬃciency proﬁle Y0 and a sym-
metric proﬁle YS0 with the same sum of initial eﬃciency levels, the most eﬃcient
type in Y0 invests more than each ﬁrm in the symmetric proﬁle and the least eﬃcient
type invests less.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result implies that in the speciﬁc setting of the linear Cournot model with
quadratic investment costs, increasing asymmetry of ﬁrms has no eﬀects on their
aggregate investments. Higher incentives to invest for more eﬃcient ﬁrms are ex-
actly oﬀset by lower incentives for less eﬃcient ﬁrms. In other words, neck-to-neck
competition and leader-laggard structures lead to the same aggregate investment.
The third result shows that decreasing appropriability reduces investments.
Proposition 3 (Appropriability). Suppose that the following condition holds:
∂2Πi(·)
∂λ∂yi
< 0. (6)
Then, for any pair λ′, λ′′ such that λ′ < 0.5 < λ′′ and every i, yi
∗
(λ′) > yi
∗
(λ′′).
17Propositions 1 and 2 in Athey and Schmutzler (2001) make this intuition more precise by
showing that the properties given in (5) imply increasing dominance both in the case of strategic
substitutes and in the case of strategic complements.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, an increase in λ has two countervailing eﬀects on marginal investment
incentives. First, higher spillovers mean that investments have a stronger positive
eﬀect on the competitor’s eﬃciency, which makes investment less attractive. Second,
however, for given cost reductions of the competitors, larger values of the spillover
parameter reduce ﬁrm i’s marginal cost and thus increase its eﬃciency level. The
resulting increase in demand (mark-up) then leads to a higher investment of ﬁrm i.
Condition (6) ensures that the ﬁrst of the two eﬀects dominates, so that a higher
value of the spillover parameter reduces ﬁrm i’s marginal incentive to invest.18
2.6 The Cooperative Benchmark
As a benchmark for the non-cooperative game, we now consider the model where
ﬁrms choose outputs non-cooperatively, but choose investments so as to maximize
their joint proﬁt. The main reason for doing so is that, in our experimental setting,
we shall reduce the game to a one-period investment model, with payoﬀs for each
investment proﬁle corresponding to those implied if players choose the Nash equilib-
rium in the corresponding output game. The cooperative benchmark is then simply
the joint-proﬁt maximizing outcome in this static game.19
Assuming that the ﬁrms pick their investments cooperatively, the problem is to
max
y∈RI
Π(y;Y0, α, λ, κ) =
I∑
i=1
Πi(y;Y0, α, λ, κ)
s.t. yi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., I.
Assuming that the Hessian of the joint-proﬁt function is negative deﬁnite, a unique
solution exists. We refrain from characterizing the solution analytically and evaluate
it numerically for our experimental study.20
The ﬁnal result allows us to compare ﬁrm i’s non-cooperative investment decision
to ﬁrm i’s optimal investment choice under a cooperative agreement.
Proposition 4 (Deviation from JPM). Let yi
∗
and yi
∗∗
denote ﬁrm i’s equi-
librium investment levels under non-cooperation and cooperation, respectively, and
suppose that Π(·) is concave. For λ < 0.5, we have yi∗(λ) > yi∗∗(λ); for λ > 0.5, we
have yi
∗
(λ) < yi
∗∗
(λ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
18Straightforward calculations show that condition (6) is automatically satisﬁed in symmetric
games and met in asymmetric games if and only if ﬁrms are not “too asymmetric”. In the experi-
mental speciﬁcation, the parameters are chosen to meet the requirement.
19Also, for the symmetric case, the cooperative benchmark is often regarded as an appropriate
description of R&D-cartels, where ﬁrms are allowed to cooperate in R&D, but must compete on
the product market (see, e.g., d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988).
20Given a set of parameters, it is easy to check whether the Hessian is negative deﬁnite.
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The intuition reﬂects the nature of the externality from investment. For illustra-
tion, consider the case where λ < 0.5, where investing exerts a negative externality
on rival ﬁrms. Therefore, players invest more than socially optimal for the group of
players and the equilibrium investment lies above the joint-proﬁt maximizing level.
3 Hypotheses
We now summarize the testable hypotheses that the theory provides. The following
Hypotheses 1 through 4 are implications of Nash behavior. If they are conﬁrmed in
the laboratory setting, ﬁndings are consistent with the view that the rational choice
model of Section 2 captures important aspects of subjects’ behavior.
The ﬁrst hypothesis corresponds to Proposition 1.
Hypothesis 1 (Dominance). In asymmetric games, ﬁrms with a higher initial
eﬃciency level invest more than ﬁrms with a lower initial eﬃciency level.
Next, we turn to the two comparative-statics predictions. Proposition 2 yields
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (Technological Gap). Changes in the distribution of initial eﬃ-
ciency levels have no impact on aggregate investments, but compared to the symmetric
case, a mean-preserving spread of the initial eﬃciency levels leads to higher invest-
ments of the leader and lower investments of the laggard.
Thus, in the speciﬁc setting discussed here, it does not matter for the aggregate
outcome whether competition is neck-to-neck or if ﬁrms with high marginal costs
face competitors with low marginal costs.
Proposition 3, which reﬂects the notion that decreasing appropriability reduces
investments, leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (Appropriability). As spillovers increase, players invest less.
Our ﬁnal derived hypothesis concerns the players’ deviation from the joint-proﬁt
maximization benchmark.
Hypothesis 4 (Deviation from JPM). Relative to joint-proﬁt maximization,
players overinvest (underinvest) in the presence of negative (positive) externalities.
Hence, we expect players to deviate in precisely the way that one would expect
from rational players in settings with positive and negative externalities, respectively.
4 Experimental Design
4.1 Overview
The experiment was designed to investigate Hypotheses 1 through 4. To test Hypoth-
esis 1, we clearly require asymmetric treatments, where ﬁrms diﬀer in their initial
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Table 1: Summary of treatments.
Across Subjects Treatments
No-Spillover (NS ) Spillover (S )
Within Subjects Treatments: Within Subjects Treatments:
LE HE LE HE
SYM SYM-LE SYM-HE SYM SYM-LE SYM-HE
ASYM ASYM-LE ASYM-HE ASYM ASYM-LE ASYM-HE
eﬃciency levels. To test Hypothesis 2, we compare such asymmetric treatments with
symmetric treatments where all ﬁrms have identical initial eﬃciency levels, but the
average eﬃciency is the same. To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we compare treatments
with and without spillovers. Finally, to investigate the robustness of our results,
we introduce a third dimension of treatment variation apart from symmetry (SYM )
vs. asymmetry (ASYM ) and spillovers (S ) vs. no-spillovers (NS ): We compare a
setting where ﬁrms have high initial eﬃciency levels (HE) with settings with low
initial eﬃciency levels (LE). This treatment variation is attractive, because it seems
conceivable that the absolute levels of initial cost diﬀerences might have an eﬀect on
the occurrence of increasing dominance.
Table 1 summarizes our treatments, highlighting the three dimensions of treat-
ment variation. As we shall detail in Section 4.2, we varied the spillover dimension
across subjects and the two other dimensions within subjects. More speciﬁcally, we
chose the parameter values as follows. In all treatments, groups of six players were
formed, possible investment choices were restricted to the interval [0, 12], and the
net-demand parameter (α = 120) and the cost parameter (κ = 3) were unaltered.
We chose λ = 0 in the no-spillover treatments and λ = 0.6 in the spillover treat-
ments.21 These choices guarantee that we have negative externalities (and strategic
substitutes) in the no-spillover case, and positive externalities (and strategic comple-
ments) in the spillover case. Finally, we chose the initial eﬃciency levels as shown in
Table 2. The levels are the same in the spillover and no-spillover case. For the sym-
metric treatments, we chose Y0 = (5, ..., 5) and Y0 = (11, ..., 11). In the corresponding
asymmetric treatments, Y0 = (9, 9, 6.5, 6.5, 1, 1) and Y0 = (18, 18, 13, 13, 2, 2), respec-
tively. In particular, there are three types of players, “leaders” (highest eﬃciency),
“followers” (medium eﬃciency) and “laggards” (lowest eﬃciency).
21The parameter value λ = 0.6 was chosen to make the calculations for the subjects relatively
simple.
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Table 2: Distributions of initial eﬃciency levels.
Within Subjects Treatments
LE HE
SYM Y0 = (5.5, ..., 5.5) Y0 = (11, ..., 11)
ASYM Y0 = (9, 9, 6.5, 6.5, 1, 1) Y0 = (18, 18, 13, 13, 2, 2)
4.2 Details
To implement our treatment variations, we chose to vary the spillover dimension
across subjects, whereas the other two dimensions where varied within subjects only.
Speciﬁcally, in both the spillover and the no-spillover treatment, two sessions were
run, each consisting of 16 replications of the stage-game in ﬁve six-player groups.
In both treatments, we confronted subjects with eight diﬀerent roles, with each role
repeated twice. Subjects played the symmetric high-eﬃciency and low-eﬃciency
treatments, and they took the role of the leaders, laggards and followers in the
asymmetric high-eﬃciency and low-eﬃciency treatments, respectively.
In the two-stage model of Section 2 ﬁrms ﬁrst choose their investment levels
and then they compete in the product market. In order to isolate the impact of
the incentives arising from the investment stage in the cleanest possible way we
confronted subjects at the investment stage with payoﬀ tables that were based on the
Cournot equilibrium that results from every eﬃciency combination at the investment
stage. Thus, subjects did not choose the output quantities at the second stage of the
game; they merely determined their investment levels at the ﬁrst stage, knowing the
consequences of each combination of their own eﬃciency level and the eﬃciency level
of the other members of the group. This simpliﬁcation is crucial because otherwise it
would have been impossible to isolate the impact of the investment incentives on self-
reinforcing market dominance. If, for example, subjects deviate (for whatever reason)
from the Cournot equilibrium this deviation may dilute or remove the incentives for
leaders to invest more than laggards. Thus, if subjects had played the second stage of
the game we would have lost control over investment incentives and, as a consequence,
we would have been unable to isolate the impact of investment incentives on behavior.
Irrespective of the treatment, each replication of the static game is described
as follows. At the beginning of each replication, the experimenter informs subjects
about the initial eﬃciency level of the ﬁrm they are representing, and the initial
eﬃciency levels of the other ﬁrms in their group. Then, they can choose investment
levels which improve their initial eﬃciency level. Each subject knows that its product
market proﬁt depends both on the own eﬃciency level and the average eﬃciency
level of the other players in the group. Since the subjects choose their investment
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Table 3: Part of the product market proﬁt table.
Y i1 → 5.5 6.0 · · · 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0 11.5 12.0 12.5
Y¯ −i1 ↓
5.5 321 337 · · · 456 475 493 513 532 552 573
6.0 309 324 · · · 441 459 478 497 516 536 556
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
9.5 227 240 · · · 342 358 375 391 409 426 444
10.0 217 229 · · · 329 345 361 377 394 412 429
10.5 206 219 · · · 316 332 348 364 380 397 414
11.0 196 208 · · · 304 319 334 350 366 383 400
11.5 186 198 · · · 291 306 321 337 353 369 386
12.0 177 188 · · · 279 294 309 324 340 356 372
12.5 167 178 · · · 268 282 296 311 327 342 358
Notes: Y i1 and Y¯
−i
1 denote, respectively, the own eﬃciency level and the competi-
tors’ average eﬃciency level. Best replies are typed in italics, ﬁrm i’s equilibrium
product market proﬁt is typed in bold face. Of course, these quantities were not
emphasized in the instructions.
simultaneously, they do not yet know the average ex-post eﬃciency level of the
other members in their group when they make their choices; thus, they have to
form expectations about their competitors’ average eﬃciency level. To calculate the
payoﬀs corresponding to these expectations and on their own investment decisions,
subjects can use product market proﬁt and cost tables, as well as a calculator.
To illustrate the product market proﬁt table, we now consider the treatment
NS-LE-ASYM. Table 3 shows a part of the table that the subjects used. The ﬁrst
row gives the eﬃciency level of the subject’s ﬁrm, whereas the ﬁrst column gives
the average eﬃciency level of the other ﬁrms. For example, the subjects’ product
market proﬁt is 573 points for Y i1 = 12.5 and Y¯
−i
1 = 5.5. Thus, subject i’s product
market proﬁt is 573 points after investing 7 units (as the initial eﬃciency level is
5.5 units), under the assumption that the other ﬁrms do not invest. To obtain their
net proﬁt, subjects used the cost table to ﬁnd out the relevant cost of an investment
equal to 7 units (which are 3× 72 = 147 points). In this fashion, subjects could, in
principle, compute the best reply for a given expectation of average investments of
the other ﬁrms. For illustrative purposes, Table 3 presents best replies (in italics)
and the equilibrium product market proﬁt (in bold face).
After 90 seconds, the subjects must take a deﬁnite decision. Finally, they are
informed about actual investments of each group member and their own net proﬁt.
In all S -treatments, the subjects’ tasks are exactly the same, and they must also
use the same tables. The only diﬀerence to the NS -treatments arises due to the
presence of spillovers: The subjects’ eﬃciency levels are not determined by the sum
of their own initial eﬃciency level and their own investment only—they also depend
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on the spillovers from group members.22
Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and were randomly al-
located to groups of six subjects upon arrival at the laboratory (partners-setting).
Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology in Zurich. A total of 120 subjects participated in the experiment, and
none of them in more than one session. All experiments were computerized using
the software “z-Tree” (Fischbacher, 2007) to run the experiment.
Before subjects played the experiment, they were given time to carefully read the
instructions and to solve some simple examples to make sure that they understood
the experiment correctly. There was no communication during the experiment.
An average session lasted 120 minutes. The net proﬁts in points attained in the
16 replications of the games were converted to Swiss francs (1 point = CHF 0.80). On
average, a subject earned CHF 46.55 (about $38) in theNS -treatment and CHF 59.85
(about $49) in the S -treatment, including a show-up fee of CHF 10.00 (about $8).
5 Experimental Results
This section presents tests of Hypotheses 1 through 4, which are all implied by Nash
behavior. In Section 5.1, we shall ﬁrst compare the experimental investment decisions
to the Nash benchmarks. It will turn out that there is signiﬁcant overinvestment
relative to the Nash equilibrium, so that we cannot take the hypotheses for granted.
In the remaining Sections 5.2 through 5.5, we therefore test each hypothesis in turn.
5.1 The Predictive Power of Nash Benchmarks
Table 4 presents some simple summary statistics of experimental investment deci-
sions, along with the theoretical predictions. A comparison of average type-speciﬁc
investments and Nash benchmarks suggests, except for type-1 ﬁrms, a tendency to
overinvest relative to the Nash prediction (in Table 4, the corresponding deviations
from the Nash equilibrium, ∆, are positive).
To test whether the deviation from the Nash prediction is statistically signiﬁcant,
we ﬁrst introduce some notation. We let yˆit,k denote subject i’s period t investment
decision, where the subscript k assigns the observation to the group, or industry, in
which the subject operates. Similarly, we let yi
∗
t denote the Nash prediction. The
overinvestment relative to the Nash prediction, ∆it,k, can thus be expressed as
∆it,k = yˆ
i
t,k − yi
∗
t .
Regressing overinvestment on a constant yields an estimate of 0.64 units with
(robust) standard error 0.094 (see Table 5, Model I).23 Thus, there is a highly sig-
22Speciﬁcally, subjects know that their own eﬃciency level is determined by the sum of their own
initial eﬃciency level, own investment, and three times the average investment of the other group
members. Formally, this can be seen by letting λ = 0.6 in Eq. (2).
23Standard errors are clustered on groups as the within group observations may not be indepen-
dent from each other.
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Table 4: Theoretical benchmarks and summary of investment decisions.
Benchmarks Experimental Investments
Treatments Nash JPM Average Median S.D. ∆
No-Spillover
SYM-LE Type 5.5 5.34 0.86 5.70 5.00 1.58 0.36
SYM-HE Type 11 5.57 0.90 6.33 6.00 1.79 0.76
ASYM-LE Type 9 6.74 2.44 7.78 7.00 1.69 1.04
Type 6.5 5.74 1.19 6.36 6.00 1.45 0.62
Type 1 3.54 0.00 3.47 3.00 1.04 -0.06
ASYM-HE Type 18 8.37 3.95 9.17 9.00 1.58 0.80
Type 13 6.37 1.45 6.85 6.00 1.70 0.48
Type 2 1.97 0.00 2.27 2.00 1.23 0.30
Spillover
SYM-LE Type 5.5 2.79 3.83 3.54 3.00 1.77 0.75
SYM-HE Type 11 2.91 4.00 3.90 3.00 1.98 0.99
ASYM-LE Type 9 3.32 4.32 4.36 4.00 1.81 1.04
Type 6.5 2.94 3.97 3.46 3.00 1.49 0.52
Type 1 2.10 3.20 2.08 2.00 1.37 -0.02
ASYM-HE Type 18 3.97 4.99 5.22 4.00 2.32 1.25
Type 13 3.21 4.28 4.25 4.00 1.98 1.04
Type 2 1.55 2.73 1.89 2.00 1.05 0.34
Notes: Average and median experimental investments, standard deviations (S.D.), and average
deviations from the Nash equilibrium (∆) based on 120 observations for each ﬁrm type.
niﬁcant overall tendency to overinvest relative to the Nash benchmark. This result
is also supported when we split the sample into early and late periods (see Table 5,
Model II):24 Although overinvestment signiﬁcantly decreases by 0.34 units from 0.81
to 0.47 units in late periods, it remains persistent at the 1% conﬁdence level.25 Sum-
ming up, we have the following:
Observation 2. There is signiﬁcant, albeit small, overinvestment relative to the
Nash benchmark that varies across treatments.
It is important to note that this observation is essentially independent of the treat-
24Throughout the paper, early and late periods refer to the ﬁrst and second replication of each
HE and LE treatment, respectively, as subjects are twice in each role.
25The result is corroborated at the treatment level when controlling for spillovers and symmetry.
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Table 5: Overinvestment.
Model I Model II Model III
Variable Dep. Var.: ∆it,k Dep. Var.: ∆
i,C
t,k
const 0.6372*** 0.8083*** 4.5394***
(0.0943) (0.1197) (0.1309)
late −0.3421***
(0.1035)
spill −4.9720***
(0.1830)
sym 0.4152***
(0.1007)
Notes: Overinvestment (Models I and II, respectively), and the ob-
served deviation from the JPM prediction (Model III) at the overall
level. Dependent variable in Models I and II is subject i’s period t
overinvestment in group k; in Model III, dependent variable is subject
i’s period t deviation from the JPM prediction in group k. 360 obser-
vations in each treatment; *** = Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering on groups in parenthesis.
ment and of the role (leader, follower, laggard) that an individual plays: In 14 of the
16 cases, the players’ investments are (slightly) above the Nash prediction. In par-
ticular, overinvestment occurs in both the no-spillover and the spillover treatments.
This is striking, because overinvestment in a game without spillovers corresponds
to a behavior that is less cooperative than in the Nash equilibrium, whereas in the
game with spillovers the overinvestment corresponds to more cooperative behavior.
A possible explanation for this phenomenon relies on the fact that investments
are strategic complements in the case with spillovers but substitutes in the case
without spillovers.26 This diﬀerence in strategic incentives between spillover and
no-spillover treatments could interact with the existence of reciprocal preferences
such that overinvestment results in both cases.27 Suppose, for example, that the
population contains reciprocal and egoistic players and assume that the reciprocal
players expect others to overinvest in the spillover treatment. Overinvestment in
the spillover treatment means that the overinvesting players generate a beneﬁt (pos-
itive externality) for the others, i.e., overinvesting is a kind behavior. Therefore,
26The role of strategic complementarity and substitutability for aggregate deviations from ratio-
nality or Nash equilibrium play has been examined by Haltiwanger and Waldmann (1985, 1989),
Fehr and Tyran (2001, 2005), and Potters and Suetens (2005).
27There is ample evidence that social preferences play a role in strategic games in which players
can aﬀect each others payoﬀs (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Often social preferences take the form of
preferences for reciprocity (Levine, 1998; Rabin, 1999; Duwfenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and
Fischbacher, 2006; Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad, 2007; Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj, forthcoming).
An individual with reciprocal preferences responds to (the expectation of) kind acts with kind
behavior and to (the expectation of) hostile behavior with hostility.
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a reciprocal player will respond to this expectation with overinvestment. In ad-
dition, the selﬁsh players will also overinvest because of strategic complementarity
(i.e., they have pecuniary incentives to overinvest given that the reciprocal players
overinvest relative to Nash). Thus, in the case of spillovers between the investing
subjects, strategic complementarity and a positive fraction of reciprocal players may
contribute to overinvestment.
In the no-spillover case the existence of reciprocal players may contribute to over-
investments relative to the Nash equilibrium because in these treatments investing
imposes a negative externality on the other subjects. Therefore, investing according
to or above the Nash equilibrium is likely to be viewed by the reciprocal subjects as
unkind behavior that deserves retaliation whereas underinvestment relative to the
Nash equilibrium is likely to be viewed as kind behavior because it reduces negative
externalities. Note also, that due to strategic substitutability, egoistic players will
never reciprocate kind acts of underinvestment; instead, they respond to underinvest-
ment with overinvestments. Whether the selﬁsh players play the Nash equilibrium or
whether they even overinvest, reciprocal players are likely to interpret such behaviors
as hostile and respond with retaliation, i.e., they will overinvest in order to punish
the other investors. Thus, overinvestment in the no-spillover treatment could be the
result of reciprocal players’ retaliatory behavior.
Because investments are close to the levels prescribed by the Nash hypothesis, it
seems conceivable that Hypotheses 1 through 4 will be conﬁrmed. Nevertheless, as
observations and predictions diﬀer, we cannot take this for granted.
5.2 Increasing Dominance
To investigate our main hypothesis of increasing dominance, we now compare the
investment behavior in the asymmetric treatments. We have the following result:
Result 1a (Dominance). The higher a ﬁrm’s initial eﬃciency level the larger
is the ﬁrm’s investment on average, that is, subjects’ behavior exhibits increasing
dominance. This result holds in each of the asymmetric treatments.
Figures 1 and 2 provide a graphical representation of Result 1a (for treatments
NS and S, respectively): On average, the more eﬃcient ﬁrms invest more than less
eﬃcient ﬁrms.28 This notion can be conﬁrmed in Figure 3, which goes beyond Fig-
ures 1 and 2 by plotting the cumulative distribution of the subjects’ investment
choices instead of averages only. Inspection of the ﬁgure reveals that the cumula-
tive distribution function of investments of leaders (followers) is below the graph of
followers (laggards) in all treatments. This implies that the average investment of
leaders exceeds the average investment of followers, and that followers invest more on
average than laggards. To substantiate Result 1a, we estimate the following model:
yˆit,k = β0 + β1δ
i
leader ,k + β2δ
i
laggard ,k + e
i
t,k,
28The Nash benchmarks lie below the relevant lower bounds of the 95% conﬁdence intervals
for average investments, which again reﬂects the notion that subjects invest a signiﬁcantly larger
amount than prescribed by Nash behavior.
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Figure 1: Average investments in the NS-LE treatment with the corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals, along with the
theoretical benchmarks (in panel a, panel b displays NS-HE treatment).
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Figure 2: Average investments in the S-LE treatment with the corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals, along with the
theoretical benchmarks (in panel a, panel b displays S-HE treatment).
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of investment choices in asymmetric treatments.
where eit,k is a residual that is assumed to be independent across groups k. For each
subject i in group k, the preceding equation relates the investment decision in each
period t to a constant and two dummy variables that take value 1 if subject i’s
investment decision is taken in the role of a leader and a laggard, respectively.29
Table 6 gives the parameter estimates for each asymmetric treatment. To illus-
trate, consider the treatment NS-LE. By construction, the estimate of the constant
term, which is equal to 6.36 units, reﬂects the average investment of a follower (see
Table 4). The estimated coeﬃcient on the dummy variable leader indicates that,
on average, a subject invests 1.42 units more as leader than as follower, amounting
to a total average investment of 7.78 units (refer, again, to Table 4). As the esti-
mated coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (p–value < 0.001), we conclude
that the average investment of leaders signiﬁcantly exceeds the average investment
of followers. The estimated coeﬃcient on the dummy variable laggard can be in-
terpreted similarly: A subject invests on average 2.89 units less as laggard than
as follower. Thus, laggards invest 3.47 units on average, and the diﬀerence to the
followers’ investment of 6.36 units is signiﬁcant (at the 1% conﬁdence level).
29Recall that each subject is twice in each of the three possible roles, and that there are 6 subjects
in each group. As there are 10 groups, we have a total of 360 observations in each treatment.
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Table 6: Estimation results for the increasing dominance hypothesis.
Asymmetric Treatments
Variable NS-LE NS-HE S-LE S-HE
const 6.3625*** 6.8525*** 3.4563*** 4.2458***
(0.1433) (0.2142) (0.1345) (0.2327)
leader 1.4208*** 2.3142*** 0.9063*** 0.9792***
(0.1232) (0.1204) (0.1585) (0.2365)
laggard −2.8875*** −4.5858*** −1.3792*** −2.3583***
(0.1508) (0.2025) (0.1196) (0.2202)
Notes: Dependent variable is subject i’s period t investment decision in group k (yˆit,k).
360 observations in each treatment; *** = Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering on groups in parenthesis.
Similarly, inspection of Table 6 reveals that average experimental investment
decisions satisfy the increasing dominance hypothesis in all asymmetric treatments
even though subjects do not choose Nash investments, which conﬁrms Hypothesis 1.
Interestingly, the following result shows that the subjects’ tendency to overinvest
relative to the Nash prediction even reinforces increasing dominance.
Result 1b (Increasing Overinvestment). The pattern of overinvestment rela-
tive to the Nash prediction reinforces increasing dominance as more eﬃcient ﬁrms
overinvest more than less eﬃcient ﬁrms.
The fact that overinvestment tends to increase with the ﬁrm-type can be seen
most directly in Table 4. To test for signiﬁcance of the result, we estimate the model
∆it,k = β0 + β1δ
i
leader ,k + β2δ
i
laggard ,k + e
i
t,k.
Estimates are presented in Table 7. Consider again the treatment NS-LE to illus-
trate: By construction, the estimate of the constant term, which is equal to 0.62
units, reﬂects the subjects’ average overinvestment in the role of a follower. As the
estimated coeﬃcient on the dummy variable leader is highly signiﬁcant, the lead-
ers’ average overinvestment of 1.04 units thus exceeds that of laggards. Also, the
subjects overinvest on average 0.69 units less as laggards than as followers (and
therefore underinvest relative to the Nash prediction). As this diﬀerence in average
overinvestment is again signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level, Result 1b is conﬁrmed.
Using similar reasoning, Table 7 shows that more eﬃcient ﬁrms overinvest more
than less eﬃcient ﬁrms in treatment S-LE (at the 1% conﬁdence level). The es-
timated diﬀerences in the HE-treatments also support Result 1b. Although not
all diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant, the p–values of the hypothesis tests that
types do not matter suggest to reject this hypothesis in all treatments at the 10%
conﬁdence level, and in three cases at the 1% conﬁdence level. Thus, the tendency
towards self-reinforcing dominance is more pronounced than theory would predict.
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Table 7: Estimation results for the increasing overinvestment hypothesis.
Asymmetric Treatments
Variable NS-LE NS-HE S-LE S-HE
const 0.623*** 0.483* 0.516*** 1.036***
(0.143) (0.214) (0.135) (0.233)
leader 0.421*** 0.314** 0.526*** 0.219
(0.123) (0.120) (0.159) (0.237)
laggard −0.688*** −0.186 −0.539*** −0.698**
(0.151) (0.203) (0.120) (0.220)
p–value that types 0.003 0.057 0.000 0.007
do not matter
Notes: Dependent variable is subject i’s period t overinvestment in group k (∆it,k). 360 obser-
vations in each treatment; * = Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** = Signiﬁcant at the 5% level;
*** = Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on groups in
parenthesis.
5.3 The Technological Gap
We now investigate the eﬀect of altering the technological gap between the ﬁrms. As
detailed in the model section, aggregate investments in the subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium are predicted to be equal in the symmetric and asymmetric treatments
(Hypothesis 2). Figure 4 therefore compares the two treatments. To illustrate, con-
sider the NS-LE -treatments (Panel a). For each type, the ﬁgure gives the diﬀerence
between its investment in the asymmetric NS-LE -treatment and in the correspond-
ing symmetric treatment. The theoretical prediction is that types 9 and 6.5 invest
more in the asymmetric case than in the symmetric case, whereas type 1 invests less.
The experimental observations reﬂect the theoretical prediction not only qualita-
tively, but also quantitatively. Panels (b) through (d) provide a similar picture.30 In
spite of the substantial eﬀect of asymmetry for the individual types, the right-hand
columns in the ﬁgures suggest that the higher investments of high types and the
lower investments of low types roughly cancel out, as Hypothesis 2 would predict.
To test this, we employ the following model:
yˆt,k = β0 + β1δsym,k + et,k,
where et,k is a residual that is assumed to be independent across industries k (but not
necessarily across the two replications). For each industry k, the preceding equation
30For the S-LE -treatments, theory predicts slightly higher investments in the asymmetric case,
whereas average investment in the experiment is slightly higher in the symmetric case. Clearly,
however, the deviations are very small in both treatments.
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Figure 4: Predicted investment change in the asymmetric treatments relative to
the corresponding symmetric treatment and the actual average investment change.
relates aggregate investments, denoted yˆt,k,
31 to a constant and a dummy variable
taking value 1 if the observation is generated in a symmetric industry structure.32
Table 8 gives the parameter estimates for each comparison. As illustration, we
consider the comparison ∆HE in the no-spillover treatment (i.e., the comparison
of the treatments NS-ASYM-HE and NS-SYM-HE ). The estimate of the constant
term, which is equal to 36.57 units, reﬂects average aggregate investment at the in-
dustry level in the asymmetric industry conﬁguration. The estimated coeﬃcient on
the dummy variable sym indicates that average aggregate investment in a symmet-
ric industry conﬁguration is 1.40 units higher, amounting to an average aggregate
investment of 37.97 units. As shown in the table, the estimated coeﬃcient is not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at reasonable conﬁdence levels (in the case under con-
sideration, the p–value is equal to 0.187). Therefore, there is no statistical evidence
31Experimental aggregate investments in group k are deﬁned as yˆt,k =
∑
i yˆ
i
t,k.
32The total of 80 observation in each comparison can be obtained by recalling that each subject is
twice in each role, and there are 10 groups in each treatment. In symmetric treatments, where sub-
jects ﬁnd themselves only in one role, there are 20 aggregate outcomes. In asymmetric treatments
there are 60 aggregate outcomes, as there are three diﬀerent roles for each subject.
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Table 8: Estimation results for the comparison of aggregate investments.
No-Spillover Treatments Spillover Treatments
Variable ∆HE ∆LE ∆HE ∆LE
const 36.5717*** 35.2417*** 22.7167*** 19.7917***
(0.5269) (0.4706) (0.6921) (0.5490)
sym 1.4003 −1.0417 0.6833 1.4208
(1.0537) (0.9412) (1.3843) (1.0880)
Notes: ∆HE and ∆LE denote the comparison of the corresponding symmetric and asymmetric
industry structures. Dependent variable is aggregate investment in industry k in period t (yˆt,k).
80 observations in each comparison; *** = Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering on groups in parenthesis.
suggesting that average aggregate investments are diﬀerent in the two treatments.
The statistical results are very similar in the other comparisons.33 Thus, individ-
uals seem to have well understood incentives to invest: Switching from a symmetric
to an asymmetric industry structure induces subjects to invest less (more) when their
eﬃciency level is lower (higher) in the asymmetric treatment than in the symmetric
treatment, as predicted by the theoretical model.
We summarize the insights on average aggregate investments as follows.
Result 2 (Technological Gap). In the asymmetric industry, leaders, followers,
and laggards change their investment levels relative to the symmetric industry in
the predicted direction in both the low-eﬃciency and the high-eﬃciency treatment.
Moreover, these changes cancel out at the aggregate level, leaving aggregate invest-
ment unaﬀected.
5.4 Appropriability
Here, we investigate the eﬀects of introducing spillovers on investment behavior.
Table 4 shows that average investments of each ﬁrm type are considerably lower in
the S -treatments than in the NS -treatments. We now aim at exploring this ﬁnding
more thoroughly.
We approach Hypothesis 3 using the following model:
yˆit,k = β0 + β1δ
i
spill ,k + e
i
t,k,
where eit,k is a residual that is assumed to be independent across groups k. This
equation relates each subject i’s period t investment decision to a constant and a
33Observe that, except for the case ∆LE in the NS -treatment, average aggregate investments are
slightly higher in the symmetric treatments.
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dummy variable that takes value 1 if individual i’s observation is assigned to an
S -treatment.34
Estimating the model, we obtain in the NS -treatments, that subjects invest on
average 5.99 units (which is the estimate of β0). The estimate of β1 is equal to
-2.41 units with associated p–value < 0.001, implying that average investment in
the S -treatments, which amounts to 3.59 units, is signiﬁcantly lower. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3 is conﬁrmed, which leads to the following result:
Result 3 (Appropriability). Average investments in the spillover treatment are
signiﬁcantly lower than in the no-spillover treatment.35
5.5 Deviation from the Cooperative Outcome
We shall now test whether subjects overinvest in the no-spillover treatments and
underinvest in the spillover treatments relative to the joint-proﬁt maximizing bench-
mark, as predicted by Hypothesis 4.
To investigate these claims, we let yi∗∗t denote the corresponding JPM benchmark,
so that the observed deviation from the JPM prediction can be expressed as
∆i,Ct,k = yˆ
i
t,k − yi
∗∗
t .
We estimate the model
∆i,Ct,k = β0 + β1δ
i
spill ,k + β2δ
i
sym,k + e
i
t,k,
where eit,k is a residual that is assumed to be independent across groups k.
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Estimation results are presented in Table 5 (Model III). By construction, the es-
timate of β0 gives average overinvestment relative to the cooperative investment de-
cisions in asymmetric NS -treatments. Standard calculations yield that average over-
investment relative to the JPM benchmark amounts to 4.95 units in NS -treatments,
which is a highly signiﬁcant deviation.37 Thus, subjects deviate from the JPM bench-
mark by overinvesting in the presence of negative externalities.
It can be seen from Table 4 that average deviations from the JPM benchmarks
are much less pronounced and not unidirectional in the S -treatments. Therefore, a
more detailed investigation of the deviations is called for. In symmetric treatments,
simple analysis yields that subjects on average underinvest 0.02 units. Surprisingly,
34Note that each of the 8 stage-games is replicated twice and that there are 6 subjects in each
group. As there are 10 groups in each treatment, we have a total of 1,920 observations.
35In fact, the result also holds at the type-level, as a comparison of ﬁgures 1 and 2 suggests.
36Recall that the dummy variable δispill,k takes value 1 if the observation belongs to group k in
an S -treatment (and zero otherwise). Analogously, δisym,k takes value 1 in symmetric treatments.
37As subjects signiﬁcantly overinvest relative to the Nash benchmark in the NS -treatments, they
do so a fortiori relative to the JPM benchmark. In addition, inspection of Table 4 unambiguously
leads to the conclusion that average investments are substantially higher than the relevant JPM
benchmarks for all ﬁrm-types in the NS -treatments.
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average investment is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the JPM benchmarks. There-
fore, experimental investment decisions maximize industry proﬁts.38 In asymmetric
treatments, however, subjects underinvest relative to the JPM benchmark. In con-
trast to symmetric treatments, there is signiﬁcant underinvestment of 0.43 units.39
Relating to Hypothesis 4, we thus have the following result:
Result 4 (Deviation from JPM). Subjects signiﬁcantly overinvest relative to the
JPM benchmark in the no-spillover treatments. In the spillover treatments, subjects
approximately choose JPM investment levels in symmetric treatments. In asymmet-
ric treatments, subjects signiﬁcantly underinvest relative to the JPM benchmarks.
Hence, this result partially supports Hypothesis 4. Clearly, restricting attention
to outcomes at the individual level is a very strong test of the theoretical predictions.
Surprisingly, however, estimating the model using overinvestment at the group level
does not qualitatively aﬀect the ﬁndings reported in Result 4.40 We therefore have
the following observation:
Observation 3. From a joint-proﬁt maximizing perspective, aggregate investments
are ineﬃciently high in the no-spillover treatments. In the spillover treatments, in
contrast, aggregate investments turn out to be approximately eﬃcient in symmetric
treatments and ineﬃciently low in asymmetric treatments.
6 Conclusions
Theoretical models explain why markets should be expected to display self-reinforcing
dominance under appropriate conditions, but it is hard to identify these mechanisms
in real-world markets. We therefore use a laboratory experiment to ﬁnd out whether
subjects’ behavior reﬂects the crucial strategic eﬀects. We introduce a two-stage in-
vestment model which predicts that more eﬃcient ﬁrms should invest more into cost
reduction than their lagging competitors, thus providing a reason why initial market
dominance might be self-reinforcing. It turns out that there is signiﬁcant overinvest-
ment relative to the Nash benchmark. However, the overinvestment is small, and
the increasing dominance hypothesis is conﬁrmed. Moreover, the deviations from the
equilibrium follow an interesting pattern. Overinvestment is higher for more eﬃcient
types, so that the increasing dominance prediction is reinforced.
Our set-up also allows us to compare aggregate investments in neck-to-neck situ-
ations with those in asymmetric leader-laggard structures, conﬁrming the prediction
that total investments should be the same in both cases, as long as the average eﬃ-
ciency level is the same in both cases. An interesting extension of our analysis would
consider settings where theory predicts diﬀerences in both cases, which can happen,
for instance, when subjects compete in prices.
38The test’s p–value is 0.918.
39The test’s p–value is 0.003.
40The statistical details are available from the authors upon request.
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Our results also show that spillovers reduce investments in accordance with the-
ory. Finally, the relation between subjects’ decisions and joint-proﬁt maximization
is less clear than theory would suggest; in particular, in settings with spillovers,
the diﬀerence between observed investments and joint-proﬁt maximizing investment
levels is insigniﬁcant.
Apart from that, however, the conformance between theory and experiments is
striking. In spite of the unfamiliar kind of strategic problem, the Nash equilibrium
yields surprisingly good predictions. Having conﬁrmed this, it would be interesting
to see whether the observed regularities still hold when the product-market stage is
modeled explicitly. Deviations in the output stage could have interesting repercus-
sions for investment behavior. Suppose, for instance, that, in the product-market
stage, leaders choose higher output levels than in the Cournot equilibrium and, lag-
gards respond by choosing lower outputs. Anticipating this, the leader should set
higher outputs than in equilibrium, and the laggard should set lower outputs. Such
deviations would reinforce increasing dominance.
Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium under Non-Cooperative Behavior
Firm i’s net proﬁt under non-cooperative behavior is given by
Πi(y;Y0, α, λ, κ)
=
(
α+ IY i0 −
∑
j =i Y
j
0 + (I + λ(1− I)) yi + (2λ− 1)
∑
j =i y
j
I + 1
)2
− κ (yi)2 . (A.1)
In the subsequent analysis, we require that ﬁrm i’s objective function Πi satisﬁes the
second-order and stability conditions, i.e.
Πiii < 0 and
∣∣Πiii∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j =i
Πiij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (A.2)
respectively, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Letting
αi ≡ α+ IY i0 −
∑
j =i
Y j0
in (A.1), ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst-order condition reads
Πii(·) =
I + λ(1− I)
(I + 1)2

αi + (I + λ(1 − I))yi + (2λ− 1)∑
j =i
yj

− κyi = 0.
Letting further
β1 =
(
I + λ (1− I)
I + 1
)2
− κ, β2 = (2λ− 1) (I + λ(1− I))(I + 1)2 , and β3 =
I + λ(1− I)
(I + 1)2
,
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ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst-order condition may equivalently be rewritten as
β1y
i + β2
∑
j =i
yj + β3αi = 0. (A.3)
Solving for yi yields
Ri(y−i) = −β3
β1
αi − β2
β1
∑
j =i
yj,
which is ﬁrm i’s best-response function given that rivals invest y−i. Noting that β1 = Πiii
and that β2 = Πiij, respectively, we may conveniently rewrite ﬁrm i’s reaction function as
Ri(y−i) = φi − Π
i
ij
Πiii
∑
j =i
yj, with φi ≡ −β3
β1
αi. (A.4)
Thus, using (A.2),
sign
(
∂Ri(y−i)
∂yj
)
= sign
(
Πiij
)
.
As sign
(
Πiij
)
= sign (β2), the fact that
I + λ(1− I)
(I + 1)2
> 0; for all λ,
implies sign
(
Πiij
)
= sign (2λ− 1) .
In matrix notation, the system of ﬁrst-order conditions as given in (A.3) reads

β1 β2 · · · β2
β2 β1
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . β2
β2 · · · β2 β1




y1
y2
...
yI

 = −β3


α1
α2
...
αI

 ,
which we may conveniently rewrite as My = −β3α. Using the stability condition given in
(A.2), which can be restated as |β1| > (I − 1) |β2|, the matrix M has a dominant diagonal.
Thus, M is known to be nonsingular and M−1 exists, whence follows that y = −M−1β3α.
Lemma A.1. The inverse of M is given by
M−1 =
β2
(β1 − β2) (β1 − β2 + Iβ2)


β1
β2
+ (I − 2) −1 · · · −1
−1 β1β2 + (I − 2)
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . −1
−1 · · · −1 β1β2 + (I − 2)

 .
Proof. Letting I denote the identity matrix, it suﬃces to show that M−1M = I. For the
diagonal elements, we obtain
β2
(β1 − β2) (β1 − β2 + Iβ2)
(
β1
(
β1
β2
+ (I − 2)
)
− β2 (I − 1)
)
= 1.
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Similarly, we obtain for the oﬀ-diagonal elements that
β2
(β1 − β2) (β1 − β2 + Iβ2)
(
−β1 + β2
(
β1
β2
+ (I − 2)
)
− (I − 2)β2
)
= 0.
Using Lemma A.1, ﬁrm i’s equilibrium investment can computed to be
yi
∗
= − β2β3
(β1 − β2) (β1 − β2 + Iβ2)

(β1
β2
+ (I − 2)
)
αi −
∑
j =i
αj

 .
Simplifying the term in brackets on the right hand side yields(
β1
β2
+ (I − 2)
)
αi −
∑
j =i
αj =
(
β1
β2
+ (I − 1)
)
αi −
∑
i
αi
=
(
β1
β2
+ (I − 1)
)(
α+ (I + 1)Y i0 −
∑
i
Y i0
)
−
(
Iα+
∑
i
Y i0
)
,
so that ﬁrm i’s equilibrium investment can be rewritten as
yi
∗
= −β3
(
(β1 − β2)α + (β1 − β2 + Iβ2) (I + 1)Y i0 − (β1 + Iβ2)
∑
i Y
i
0
)
(β1 − β2) (β1 − β2 + Iβ2) . (A.5)
Lemma A.2. Under (A.2), both
β1 − β2 < 0 and β1 − β2 + Iβ2 < 0.
Proof. By (A.2), β1 < 0. If β2 ≥ 0, we immediately have β1 − β2 < 0. If β2 < 0,
|β1| > (I − 1) |β2| > |β2| ⇐⇒ −β1 > −β2.
Thus, β1 − β2 < 0.
Similarly, if β2 ≤ 0, (A.2) implies β1 + (I − 1)β2 < 0. If β2 > 0 , we have
|β1| > (I − 1) |β2| ⇐⇒ −β1 > (I − 1)β2.
Thus, β1 + (I − 1)β2 < 0.
With Lemma A.2 in mind and noting that β3 > 0, yi
∗
> 0 if and only if the numerator
of (A.5) is negative, i.e.,
(β1 − β2)α+ (β1 − β2 + Iβ2) (I + 1)Y i0 − (β1 + Iβ2)
∑
i
Y i0 < 0, for all i,
or equivalently, if and only if
α >
(β1 + Iβ2)
∑
j =i Y
j
0 −
(
Iβ1 + (I2 − I − 1)
)
Y i0
β1 − β2 , for all i.
Thus, equilibrium investments are positive if and only if net demand α is suﬃciently large
relative to the initial eﬃciency levels (Y 10 , . . . , Y
I
0 ).
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41Note that in the case of symmetric ﬁrms with initial eﬃciency level Y ≥ 0, the restriction on
α boils down to α+ Y > 0, or equivalently, to a > c− Y .
30
A.2 Proofs of Propositions 1 through 4
Proof of Proposition 1. From (A.5), it follows that
yi − yj = β3 (I + 1)
β1 − β2
(
Y j0 − Y i0
)
.
As β3 > 0, the claim follows from Lemma A.2. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let y ≡ ∑i yi denote aggregate investment. From (A.5), we
obtain
y = −β3
(
Iα+
∑
i Y
i
0
)
β1 − β2 + Iβ2 .
Hence, the numerator is determined by
∑
i Y
i
0 only. This completes the proof. (ii) follows
immediately from Proposition 1 and part (i) of this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. From the discussion in Footnote 15, player i’s optimal investment
yi
∗
(λ = 0.5) is independent of rivals’ actions. Note that condition (6) implies
∂Πi(λ < 0.5)
∂yi
>
∂Πi(λ = 0.5)
∂yi
>
∂Πi(λ > 0.5)
∂yi
.
Hence, for arbitrary λ < 0.5 and arbitrary actions of the competitors, the best response is
above yi
∗
(λ = 0.5), whereas for arbitrary λ > 0.5, the best response is below yi
∗
(λ = 0.5).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. We prove the statement for λ ∈ (0.5, 1]. In a Nash equilibrium,
∂Πi(y∗)/∂yi = 0. Therefore,
∂Π(y∗)
∂yi
=
∂Πi(y∗)
∂yi
+
∑
j =i
∂Πj(y∗)
∂yi
= (I − 1)(2λ − 1) > 0,
where the last two steps follow from Observation 1. As ∂Π(y∗)/∂yi > 0, for all i, concavity
implies ∂Π(y)/∂yi > 0, for all y < y∗. Thus no y ≤ y∗ can maximize the ﬁrms’ joint
proﬁt, whence follows for all i that yi
∗∗
(λ) > yi
∗
(λ). The proof for the case λ ∈ [0, 0.5) is
analogous, and therefore omitted. This completes the proof.
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